

The Importance of Issue Representation in a Polarized Congress*

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Questions related to the nature of political representation are central to a voluminous literature in political science. Despite a plethora of work, our understanding of the relationship between elected officials and their constituents remains unclear and the scholarship is rife with disagreements about the nature of representation and whether existing measures and methods used to empirically characterize the relationship are up to the task. In light of increased polarization among elected officials (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), the importance of partisanship as an influential social identity for politically active citizens (e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), and continuing disagreements whether citizens are even able to possess issue-based preferences (e.g., Converse 1964), characterizing the relative import of partisan and issue considerations in constituents' evaluations of their representatives is critical for assessing the nature of representation that can be expected.

The type of representation we can expect between constituents and elected officials depends critically on the incentives elected representatives face when deciding what actions and positions to take. Mayhew (1974) highlights how representatives' actions should be interpreted as attempts to secure their re-election and Fenno (1978) provides a rich description of how that motivation can cause representatives to present themselves to their district differently in the hopes of securing re-election. Arnold (1990) expands on these themes to provide a framework for interpreting representatives' behavior in his magisterial work *The Logic of Congressional Action*.

Understanding whether and how elected officials respond to constituency opinions requires understanding the incentives that representatives face. If, for example, constituents care only about partisanship when evaluating their incumbent, representatives will have the most incentive to focus on their fidelity to party positions. If constituents care about specific issues, however, representatives are incentivized to take positions that reflect constituents on those issues. If constituents evaluate their elected officials using heuristics that are beyond the representative's control – perhaps based on the actions of the president (e.g., Rogers 2018) or the consequence of natural disasters (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2016) – the inability of representatives to control their fate may result in them choosing to follow their personal preferences or the preferences of influential donors. Understanding the nature of representation requires understanding the reactions of constituents because those reactions presumably shape the expectations of elected officials.

Central to understanding the logic of congressional action and the type of representation produced by those actions is the premise that representatives are strategic actors whose actions reflect a careful consideration of the consequences involved. As Arnold notes, “The central question is not really whether legislators are responsive to citizens, but rather *which* citizens legislators respond to and under what conditions responsiveness varies” (p. 267). The extent to which issue-based representation occurs is a matter of some dispute. Some scholars argue that issues matter only insofar as they define a party brand that voters can use as a heuristic when voting (Cox and McCubbins 2007) – suggesting that issues only matter insofar as they help construct of a collective party brand. Recent work by Bonica and Cox (2018) and Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2018), for example, suggests that voters are more focused party-based considerations and that members no longer pay electoral costs for being “out-of-step” with their district as earlier work argued (e.g., Arnold 1990; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002 ; Canes-Wrone, Minozzi, and Reveley 2011). Work by Griffin, Newman and Nickerson (2019), however, shows that constituent evaluations respond to learning about representative positions.

To evaluate whether issue-based representation still matters, we identify the relative importance of issue-based and party-based considerations on citizens’ evaluations of their representatives. We begin by characterizing how partisan disagreement and issue-specific disagreement correlate with respondents’ evaluations of their representative using responses to the Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys fielded between 2008 and 2017. Party-misalignment has a predictably large effect on citizens’ approval of their incumbent representative, but we also find evidence of varying, and also sometimes sizable, effects of being misaligned on specific issues. Because the observed disagreement occurs even though representatives are presumably choosing positions so as to maximize their re-election, these effects presumably provide a lower bound on the importance issue-based considerations for citizens’ evaluations. Because the importance of specific issues varies between individuals and issues, we further demonstrate that aggregate measures of issue misalignment underestimate the importance of issue-based considerations.

After describing the general contours of issue-based representation, we explore the relative importance of party-based and issue-based representation using what is arguably the most prominent

and consequently the most consequential policy enacted in recent decades – the Affordable Care Act. Using characteristics presumably related to being a member of an attentive or inattentive public – including income, education, and political knowledge – we find varying effects of the importance of the ACA on incumbent evaluations. Contrary to expectations from the policy feedback literature, the evaluations of richer individuals are more responsive to representative positions on the ACA than poorer individuals despite the fact that poorer individuals are more likely to benefit from the policy benefits of the ACA. Moreover, the evaluations of poorer individuals are more likely to be affected by the positions taken by the party caucus of their elected representation than they are to be impacted by the positions taken by their representative.

1 Issue Representation, Party Representation, or Both?

The extent to which the actions of elected representatives reflect constituency preferences is a question of robust discussion and disagreement. Some scholars find a lack of issue representation in the aggregate (e.g., Bafumi and Herron 2010) or on specific issues (e.g., Highton 2019), while others find support for a strong relationship between public opinion and elite position-taking in the aggregate (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) or at the individual level (e.g., Broockman 2016; Nyhan et al. 2012). Moreover, the relative importance of issue-based and party-based considerations has arguably varied over time as increased disagreement among political elites has produced voting coalitions that are more homogeneous within party and more differentiated between parties (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Party leaders are also thought to use their position to promote agendas to unify the caucus and define an electorally valuable party brand (Cox and McCubbins 1994) – especially since party leaders now believe they can gain (or lose) the majority in every election (Lee 2016).¹ Claims regarding the increased incentives for representatives to focus on party-considerations and issues where the party is unified coincide with claims about the increasing importance of partisanship among citizens. Partisan affiliation is increasingly considered as a social

¹If coalition leaders in Congress focus on issues that are thought to unite the party caucus, it may be hard to distinguish the effects of partisan and issue-based representation precisely because the set of observed votes are chosen precisely so as to minimize the tension that members may face between their partisan and issue-based considerations .

identity (e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Considered alongside vibrant debates about whether citizens possess meaningful issue positions independent of party affiliation (see, for example, recent work by Barber and Pope (2018) and Freeder, Lenz, and Turney (2019)) and whether citizens value ideology or identity considerations (Grossman and Hopkins 2016) the potential for citizens caring about issues independently of party-based considerations is uncertain.²

Some of this disagreement may be due to the measures and methods being used. Despite a rise in the availability of measures and methods since the pioneering work of Miller and Stokes (1963), a consensus has yet to emerge about the meaning of available data. Concerns have been raised about the ability to equate responses on a public opinion survey to votes cast in Congress (Hill and Huber 2019) and also the ability to summarize constituency policy preferences by aggregating across issues (Broockman 2016).

We explore the nature of issue-based representation following the framework Arnold provides in the *Logic of Congressional Action* (1990). An important insight about the nature of issue-based representation is the anticipatory nature of the representative's decisions. As Arnold notes, "The cautious legislator, therefore, must estimate three things: the probability that an opinion might be aroused, the shape of that opinion, and its potential for electoral consequences" (p. 68). The anticipatory nature of issue-based representation has important empirical consequences. First, it means that issue-based representation can occur even if constituents are unaware of how their representative voted on an issue. As Arnold notes, "The model of citizens' control that I have been discussing is essentially an auditing model. Citizens do not instruct legislators on how to vote, nor do they necessarily have well-defined policy preferences in advance of congressional action. Legislators nevertheless have strong incentives to consider citizens' potential preferences in advance of congressional action" (p. 272). Correctly anticipating the preferences of an inattentive constituency can result in a continued lack of attention and awareness by citizens. Because instigators and challengers have no incentive to publicize the positions of representatives that are congruent with constituency

²While some find that the as parties polarized, increased alignment between issue positions and partisanship was driven by individuals being better able to align their party identification with their issue positions (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998), more recent work argues the reverse. Consistent with Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002), individuals update their issue positions to match their partisan attachments conditional on how much the individual cares about the issue (Layman and Carsey 2006) and on whether partisan elites are publicly divided on the issue (Dancey and Goren 2010).

opinion, constituents may be less aware of congruent votes than incongruent votes. Second, issue-based representation is possible even if citizens lack well defined policy preferences. So long as representatives are able to correct anticipate what constituents would think about an issue if they were motivated and mobilized to do so, inattentive publics may never have an incentive to become attentive. Representatives who take actions that are consistent with the opinions that the inattentive public would have if they were to become attentive may decrease the incentive for the inattentive public to mobilize and become attentive.

That said, there are also reasons to think that issue-based considerations may not be relevant for constituent evaluations. If, for example, citizens evaluate representatives based on “(1) whether conditions in society are improving or deteriorating and (2) which party controls the government” (p. 41) there is very little that the representative can do individually to improve their electoral security. As Arnold explains, “When citizens use the party performance rule, whether in presidential or congressional elections, they reward and punish the party that controls the presidency” (p. 42). If citizens’ evaluations are based primarily on partisanship, representatives may be able to take positions on issues unrelated to the party platform without consequence. Citizens appear to engage in this type of decision-making when evaluating state legislators, as there seems to be very little correlation between electoral outcomes and the quality of issue-representation (Rogers 2018).³

Citizens may also vary in the issues they find relevant for evaluating their representative. As Arnold notes, “Few citizens know the whole range of positions even for a single candidate. But why should they? Sampling is a highly effective oversight mechanism for voters who individually have so little influence over outcomes” (p. 55). The fact that issue-based representation may only occur on some issues for some constituents is extremely relevant for how scholars study the nature of issue-based representation. Evaluations of issue-based representation using aggregated and summary measures of issue opinions are of uncertain worth because it is unclear whether aggregate measures can adequately reflect the importance of issues if their relevance varies both by issue and by respondent. The noise introduced by aggregating and analyzing possibly irrelevant issues is

³“Blind retrospection” (Achen and Bartels 2016) would similarly minimize representatives’ incentive to represent constituency opinion – if citizens’ evaluations are independent of the positions representatives take the necessity of taking actions congruent with public opinion is dubious.

true for both constituents and elected officials. As Arnold notes in talking about the latter: “After sifting through all the roll-call votes taken in Congress over several years, I am struck by how inconsequential many of these decisions really are...Yet scores of political scientists occupy themselves attempting to determine (among other things) how much constituency opinion affects legislators’ decisions. Not surprisingly, they often find that the correlations are weak or nonexistent. Their findings do not, however, prove that legislators are unresponsive to constituency opinion” (p. 269).

To measure the relative importance of party-based and issue-based considerations for voters on their evaluations of elected officials we therefore examine the impact of individual policy positions on respondents’ evaluations of their elected officials. While issue-based considerations may be driven by outcomes rather than positions, the impossibility of knowing how policy outcomes affect individual respondents necessitates focusing on issue positions rather than issue outcomes. Moreover, our ability to detect the existence of issue-based representation in the (equilibrium) behavior of representatives and citizens we observe is imperfect. Arnold’s *Logic* reveals a tremendous range of possibilities and variation in terms of which issues might matter and to whom. Moreover, the notion of being able to somehow “test” the logic to determine the quality of representation is clearly nonsensical – insofar as we assume legislators are partaking in actions that are designed to increase their probability of re-election it is possible to rationalize any empirical pattern as being consistent with “good” – by which we mean “optimal” in the sense of responding to the incentives – representation. If representatives correctly anticipate their constituents’ reactions, optimal representation may occur even when constituents are uncertain about their own policy preferences and unaware of how their representative voted on the issues that they care about. It is impossible to determine whether the actions we observe are inconsistent with actions that were intended to give the citizens what they value without knowing the perceptions and expectations of representatives.

In what follows we assume the observed behavior is equilibrium-behavior and we describe the extent to which the observed equilibrium patterns are consistent with issue-based representation. Do citizen evaluations of representatives covary in ways consistent with citizens basing their evaluations on the positions taken by individual members, or has the polarized landscape and increased partisanship produced a party-centered notion of representation in which positions taken by individual

representatives have only limited effects on their electoral prospects?

2 Research Design

An extensive literature seeks to characterize issue representation in Congress by comparing how well representatives' positions match district opinion. Difficulties emerge because of the absence of data on constituency opinion and the difficulty of equating measures of constituency opinion and elite position-taking (Achen 1977). Recent work follows the pioneering approach of Miller and Stokes (1963) by asking respondents how they would vote on issues that were considered by Congress. While so doing provides comparable measures in theory, concerns have been raised about whether it is plausible to compare the circumstances of a roll call vote in Congress to answering a public opinion survey (Hill and Huber 2019), and whether the characterizations of proximity based measures of aggregate positions and aggregate opinions –e.g., Bafumi and Herron (2010) – reflect differences in opinion or differences in meaning.

As previously noted, characterizing issue-based representation using aggregate measures of representatives' position-taking or constituency opinion is difficult because different constituents may care about different issues. A null relationship between aggregate measures may mask the critical importance of specific issues to citizens because of the inclusion of irrelevant issues in the aggregate measures. Because of the potential heterogeneous effects, investigating the importance of each issue for citizens' evaluations is consequently essential for characterizing the relative effects of party-based and issue-based considerations on citizens' evaluations.

We use the common content of Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys (CCES) conducted between 2008 and 2017 to identify the universe of issues for which we can match issue-specific respondent opinions to representatives' roll call positions. To compare the relative importance of party-based and issue-based considerations we focus our analysis on respondents who either self-identify with a party or who indicate that they lean towards a party. Among the 346,335 respondents to the pooled CCES data we examine, only 45,780 (13.2%) are “pure” independents. We examine the effects on independents separately in supplementary analyses, but excluding pure independents

focuses the analysis on those who are most invested in the political system – those who cannot self-identify with a political party even when pushed are arguably the least invested in the political system and, as Arnold notes, “All else equal, legislators follow the preferences of those who feel most intensely about an issue” (p. 83).

Our dependent variable is simply whether the respondent approves of their elected representative or not. To identify the effect of party-based considerations we identify whether each respondent’s self-identified party affiliation – including respondents who “lean” towards a party when pushed – conflicts with the party of their incumbent representative (*Misaligned Party_i*). The estimated effect simply reflects how respondents’ evaluations differ depending on whether the respondent is affiliated with the party of the incumbent or not.

To identify the consequences of issue-based considerations we determine whether party-leaning respondent *i* provides a contrary opinion on issue *n* to the position taken by the representative on the CCES-associated roll call (*Misaligned Issue_{i,n}*). Respondents who did not offer an opinion are coded as missing and not as being in alignment with the representative, and the decision to do so does not change the substantive results. While we exclude respondents without an opinion, nearly every respondent provides a response – among the 346,335 respondents to the pooled 2008-2017 CCES studies, only 29,492 (8.5%) fail to offer an opinion on one or more issue questions. The lack of non-response is surprising given the sparseness of the questions being asked. In the 2016 CCES, for example, respondents were shown five issues and told: “Congress considered many important bills over the past few years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle.” The wording for some of these items included:

- **No Sanctuary for Criminals Act:** Withholds federal funds from states and localities that do not follow federal immigration laws.
- **Repeal Affordable Care Act:** Would repeal the Affordable Care Act.
- **American Health Care Act:** Would repeal the tax penalties on individuals for not maintaining health coverage and on employers for not offering coverage. Would end subsidies to help people purchase insurance and would end funding for states that expanded Medicaid.

- **Kate’s Law:** Increases criminal penalties for individuals in the country illegally who are convicted of certain crimes, deported, and then re-enter the U.S. illegally.

As is clear from the questions being asked, respondents are not provided with much policy-relevant information and it is unclear what, if anything they know about the policies they are providing opinions on. Given how few respondents declined to answer the questions it is hard to know if the responses measure constituents’ issue preferences, but such concerns are thankfully not particularly troubling given the nature of our analysis. Insofar as the issue-specific questions are problematic – and the responses are likely to reflect guessing or the use of party cues – it should be more difficult for us to detect the presence of issue-based considerations. If respondents are answering using party cues, for example, we would not expect to find an effect of issue-misalignment on representative approval controlling for party alignment. It is similarly unclear whether responses on a briefly worded question are comparable to the positions taken in the matched roll call in Congress (Hill and Huber 2019). If the measures reflect different considerations, it will also be harder to detect the presence of issue-based representation.

To measure issue misalignment between a respondent and their representative we compare CCES survey responses to the roll call position taken by the respondent’s representative that is associated with each CCES question. To be clear, we do not know whether the respondents are aware of how their representative voted (but see Ansolabehere and Jones (2010) for an examination of awareness in 2005 and 2006). As a result, our measure likely underestimates the impact of issue-based considerations by estimating the average effect among misaligned respondents regardless of whether respondents are aware of the misalignment. Insofar as unaware respondents contribute “noise” to the average effect of issue-misalignment on the approval of a respondent’s representative, the effects of issue-misalignment among the (unknown) subset of respondents who were aware of the discrepancy are presumably even larger because their disapproval is presumably responsible for the estimated association. The fact that we cannot determine which constituents are aware and unaware of their representative taking a contrary position is troubling from the perspective of correctly identifying the effect of issue-misalignment among voters, but it is less problematic from the perspective of assessing the potential consequences of the representative’s choice. Representatives are presum-

ably interested in knowing the overall effects of their position-taking regardless of whether their constituents are aware of their vote. If so, the effects we identify are the effects of interest because they reveal the overall impact of issue-based disagreement on constituent approval.

To estimate the relative impact of party and issue-based considerations on the approval of elected representatives, we estimate the following specification for CCES respondent i in district j in year t with issues n :

$$\Pr(\text{Support Rep})_{ijt} = \alpha_t + \beta_t * \text{Misaligned Party}_{ijt} + \sum_{n=1}^N \gamma_n * \text{Misaligned Issue}_{ijt}^n + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable in equation (1) denotes whether respondent i in district j approves of their incumbent representative during year t . α_t identifies the average support for the representative among respondents belonging to the same party as the representative and whose issue opinions also match the representatives' positions. β_t captures the difference in support between same-party and out-party respondents all else equal. γ_n reveals the effect of disagreement on approval for each of the n issues. This specification is estimated separately for each year – allowing the estimated parameters to vary over time because of time-varying differences (e.g., actions taken by the president; external events) – and standard errors are clustered by congressional district.

If representation is driven primarily by party-based considerations, variation in respondent evaluations of their incumbent representative should be driven by the party-correlated considerations captured by the average effect β . If issue-based considerations matter for constituent evaluations we should observe statistically distinguishable and substantively sizable effects for at least some of the n issues (γ_n).

To focus on the relationship in more detail, we also probe the relationship deeper using opinions on the Affordable Care Act over time – i.e., we restrict the issues we analyze using equation (1) to the ACA-related issues. In so doing, we examine whether the effects of issue-based considerations vary by respondent traits that are likely correlated with policy awareness and beneficiary status to determine the extent to which such traits may condition the importance of issue-based considerations.

To account for the possibility that the effects of issue disagreement are multiplicative rather than additive – i.e., the effect of disagreement on three issues exceeds the separate additive effects of each issue – we also summarize the effect of increasing issue misalignment on a citizen’s approval using the percentage of issues that the respondent disagrees with the representative (*Pct Misaligned Issues*). So doing risks the previously discussed problems associated with issue-aggregation, but it is still useful to examine whether such effects occur. As Arnold notes, “The question facing a legislator is seldom whether a specific roll-call vote might cost him the next election...yet small effects can quickly add up to become large effects when summed over the many issues that Congress considers each year” (p. 61).

An aggregate measure is also required to estimate the average effect of issue misalignment over time because of the fact that different issues are asked about in the different CCES surveys. To estimate the average relationship over the entire time period we estimate:

$$\Pr(\text{Support Rep})_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta * \text{Misaligned Party}_{ijt} + \kappa * \text{Pct Misaligned Issues}_i + \gamma * (\text{Misaligned Party}_i \times \text{Pct Misaligned Issues}_i) + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (2)$$

Variation in the number and importance of issues being asked by each CCES will obviously impact the meaning of the effect being attributed to κ – the average marginal effect of a one-unit increase in issue disagreement (i.e., the effect of going from 0% agreement to 100% agreement). We employ year fixed effects δ_t to partially control for this possibility. The interaction effect γ identifies whether the importance of issue misalignment varies depending on party-misalignment – conditional on party alignment, are same-party respondents more or less responsive to issue disagreement than out-party respondents?

To address claims that the nature of representation varies between the Democratic and Republican parties because of supposed differences in what members of each party care about we estimate the relationship separately for Democrat and Republican respondents. Grossman and Hopkins (2015) articulate this perspective when they argue: “The Republican Party is best viewed as the agent of an ideological movement whose members are united by a common devotion to the princi-

ple of limited government...In contrast, the Democratic Party is properly understood as a coalition of social groups whose interests are served by various forms of government activity. Most Democrats are committed less to the abstract cause of liberalism than to specific policies designed to benefit particular groups.” This perspective has consequences for the use of aggregate measures – suggesting that the meaning of an aggregate measure is less informative for Democrats than Republicans, but the consequences for the issue-specific measures we employ is less clear. Even if the meaning of issue-misalignment may vary – Republicans may interpret it as ideological betrayal while Democrats as an indicator for not supporting a preferred social group – the first-order question is whether the possibility that citizens care about different considerations produces differences in how citizens react to issue misalignment when it occurs.

Estimating equations (1) and (2) reveals the extent to which respondent evaluations depend on party-based and issue-based considerations, but three important caveats are worth noting.

First, our assessment of the relative importance of issue-based and party-based representation obviously depends on the issues that the CCES has chosen to ask about. Insofar as the issues being asked about are unrepresentative of citizens’ concerns then it is difficult to characterize the importance of issue-based considerations. Moreover, if the CCES-chosen issues were chosen because that were issues on which the parties devoted considerable attention and resources it may be hard to distinguish issue-based and party-based considerations given the mobilization of party-based considerations and resources among elites and the mass public.

Second, the effects of issue disagreement being identified are conditional on the existence of issue disagreement. Insofar as representatives are strategic in their position-taking, the disagreement we observe is a consequence of the fact that the alternative position would presumably be even worse. The disagreement we observe in the data is a consequence of intentional choices being made by the representative in terms of which respondents they choose to represent and issue misalignment is certainly not “randomly assigned.” Thankfully it is possible to sign the bias in the estimated effects – insofar as representatives are maximizing their expected electoral returns by the positions they choose to take, the effects of disagreement that we observe must *underestimate* the true expected effect of issue disagreement. It is impossible to know how much larger the effects would be if

the representative chose to alienate those whose opinions the representative chose to represent, but Arnold suggests: “It is far easier to alienate one’s longtime friends with a few very wrong votes than it is to transform one’s most steadfast opponents into reliable friends with an equal number of pleasing votes” (p. 83).

Underestimating the effects of issue-based representation has asymmetric effects on our ability to interpret the nature of representation. Because we underestimate the effects of issue-based representation, finding evidence of issue-based consequences among those citizens that the representative chooses to ignore suggests that the actual effects of issue-based considerations are even higher. In contrast, null effects are hard to interpret. A null effect may reflect the possibility that the representative chose to take the position of the citizens who care enough about the issue to punish the representative on the issue or it may reflect the possibility that issues are irrelevant for respondent evaluations. It is an unavoidable complication that it is hard to make inferences about the importance of issues for citizens who agree with the representative using only the reactions of respondents who disagree with the representative.

3 The Consequences of Issue Misalignment

Figure 1 begins by summarizing the extent to which respondent CCES responses differ from the positions taken by their representative. Most respondents offer an opinion on the issue questions, and most opinions appear consistent with the positions taken by their representative (Ahler and Broockman 2018). The fact that so many respondents disagree with their representative’s position is a consequence of the partisan divides on the issues being asked about – insofar as opinions correlate with partisanship we would expect to find fairly large levels of disagreement if citizens are not perfectly sorted into districts according to their partisanship. Even so, it is difficult to know whether the survey responses reflect strongly held policy preferences (Zaller 1992). In 2008, for example, respondents were given a “not sure” option that resulted in a much higher level of non-opinions.⁴

⁴In some years the CCES did not ask all respondents each issue question resulting in higher missing values. In 2010, 75% of respondents were not asked their opinion on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and another 75% were not asked about the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In 2011, each respondent was either asked about Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), cap and trade, or TARP resulting in 66.6% missing values for each issue.




Figure 1: Each row plots the percentage of all respondents with an opinion contrary to their representative on each issue (black) or without an opinion (grey) for each issue. Pure independents are included. The 2008 CCES included a “Not Sure” option that is coded as no opinion.

Figure 2 summarizes the results of separately estimating equation (1) for each CCEs using a binary indicator for approval (1) vs. disapproval (0).⁵ Ten separate regressions are presented in Figure 2 and Tables 2 and 3 of the Appendix reports the associated point estimates from each of the ten specifications.

The results are immediately revealing for the extent to which issue-based considerations impact the approval of representatives. The effect of party-misalignment is unsurprisingly large and the average effect of party-misalignment exceeds -0.4 across the 10 specifications summarized in Figure 2. A magnitude of this effect is sufficient to produce a predicted evaluation of near indifference (i.e., a predicted approval of around .5) given the estimated intercepts among party-misaligned respondents. Party-misalignment is alone sufficient to cause respondents' approval to shift from complete approval to mere indifference.


More surprising given the previously noted measurement issues is the fact that issue-based considerations also appear to matter for respondent evaluations of their representative. Among the 50 issues that were asked about, 38 had effects that were statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. Moreover, the effects of issue disagreement is sometimes considerable – respondents who disagreed with the positions taken by their representative on the Affordable Care Act, for example, were between .1 and .2 less likely to approve of their representative on the 0-1 scale relative to a respondent who agreed with the representative's position. While the effect of partisan misalignment is obviously considerable, the results clearly suggest that issue misalignment also matters for respondents' evaluations of their incumbent.

We can also consider the aggregate effect of issue-misalignment by calculating the percentage of issues on which the respondent disagrees with the representative. Pooling across time to estimate equation (2) reveals the extent to which partisans differ in terms of the impact of issue-misalignment. Figure 3 plots the resulting coefficient estimates. (Table 4 in the Appendix reports the full set of coefficient estimates.)

Several conclusions emerge from Figure 3. First, although party misalignment continues to

In 2015, 50% of respondents were not asked about the USA Freedom Act. Finally, in 2016, 79% of respondents were not asked about the USA Freedom Act and another 79% were not asked about Trade Adjustment Assistance.

⁵A 5-point scale provides substantively similar results



Effect of Issue Misalignment on Inc. Approval Among Partisans

Figure 2: The plotted effects are the issue-misalignment effects for each issue (γ_n) and also the effect of party misalignment κ estimated in each year. The 95% confidence intervals are clustered by congressional district. The estimates were computed separately for each CCES year.




Figure 3: Effect of Overall Misalignment on Approval of Representative Among Partisan Leaners (2008-12). The effects being plotted are the β , κ and γ from equation (2) estimated using all partisan leaners (bottom), Democrat leaners (middle), and Republican leaners (top). 95% confidence intervals are clustered by congressional district. Full results are reported in Table 4.

have the largest negative effect on a respondent's evaluation of their incumbent representative, issue misalignment also matters. In fact, the marginal effect of increased issue misalignment among respondents aligned with the party of their incumbent is nearly identical between partisans (-.197 for Republicans and -.219 for Democrats). Because the measure of issue-misalignment measures the fraction of votes with disagreement, the effect of issue disagreement is somewhat muted relative to the individual issue effects noted in Figure 2 – the difference in approval between a respondent who completely agrees and completely disagrees with the positions taken by the representative is .2 on the 0-1 approval scale (i.e., about the same effect as disagreeing with the representative on just the ACA when estimating the effect of individual issues). The fact that issue misalignment matters controlling for partisan misalignment suggests that issue-representation is indeed a relevant consideration for representatives. Issues appear to still matter for citizens' evaluations.

The interaction effect between party misalignment and issue misalignment also reveals that there are effects of issue misalignment above and beyond the effects attributable to party-misalignment and misaligned voters are actually slightly more responsive to changes in the level of overall issue-misalignment. Among Republicans in a district with a Democrat incumbent, a 100% change in the percentage of misaligned issues results in a -.45 effect on approval. Among Democrats in a district with a Republican incumbent, the same 100% shift would produce a -.27 effect. As a result, insofar as there are differences in the importance of issues by partisanship as some claim, it is a difference that only seems to emerge among partisans living in misaligned districts. Moreover, the party-related difference in the importance of issue-based considerations is relatively modest.

4 Issue Misalignment and the ACA

Having provided evidence that issue-based representation appears to be of continued relevance, based on how citizens' evaluations of their incumbent representative vary depending on issue-misalignment, we now focus on the importance of issues using the Affordable Care Act. This is an appropriate focus not only because of how consequential the law has been both in terms of policy and political effects, but also because congressional action appears to satisfy the conditions Arnold

identifies as enabling issue-based representation. Not only did elected officials choose to publicize their actions on the Affordable Care Act (as well as those of their opponents), but a host of explanations were also offered to citizens about the consequences of the actions being taken. Moreover, given the importance of the ACA for political debates and elections it was nearly impossible for legislators to avoid taking an explicit position on the ACA and its closely-associated policies (e.g., Medicaid expansion).

While the ACA offers an important opportunity to evaluate the consequences of issues for citizens' evaluations because of its impact and importance, the fact that it was so partisan may make it harder than usual to detect the importance of issue representation. Both parties actively positioned themselves on the issue and coalition leaders tried to keep their party caucuses united – especially when they were in control of the agenda. Precisely because of how prominent and important the issue was – and how much the parties chose to use the issue to define themselves – the ACA arguably presents a hard case for finding evidence of issue-based representation and it may be hard to distinguish the effects of party representation and issue representation. To be clear, the difficulty we face in identifying the effect of issue-based representation is a consequence of having to use the reactions of issue-misaligned voters to identify the effects of issue-based considerations combined with the fact that the effects of issues and partisanship can be disentangled only by variation in position-taking among representatives belonging to the same party.

We build upon the analyses of the prior section to focus more specifically on the effect of issue misalignment on citizens' evaluations of their representatives among those with misaligned preferences. Because politics at the national level is extremely partisan and exhibits very little variation, within-party variation in opinions regarding the ACA largely occurs at the citizen-level and our investigation describes how citizens' react when their representatives take a contrary position in Congress. Put differently, which respondents are likely to have misaligned preferences from their representative (who is likely following the party line given the partisanship of the ACA), and what are the consequences of that misalignment on the respondent's evaluation of their representative?

Table 1 describes the set of roll call votes that the CCES asked respondents about. These are the opinions that we analyze in the analysis that follows using three questions on the vote related to

the ACA (in the 2009, 2010, and 2011 CCES), five CCES questions on votes to repeal the ACA (in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016), and one question on the vote to pass the Republican alternative (the AHCA) in 2017.

Table 1: Votes on Affordable Care Act and Repeal Efforts

Bill	Bill Title	Data	Vote
HR 1628	American Health Care Act	5/4/2017	(217-213)
HR 3762	2017 Budget Resolution	1/6/2016	(240-81)
HR 596	To Repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act	2/3/2015	(239-186)
HR 45	To Repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act	5/16/2013	(245-189)
HR 2	Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act	1/19/2011	(245-189)
HR 3590	Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act	3/21/2010	(219-212)

4.1 Support for the ACA

To begin, we start by examining whether the effect of issue-misalignment on the ACA varies depending on the income level of constituents. The relationship identified previously revealed a larger correlation between negative evaluations and misalignment about wealthier individuals, but there are reasons to think that this may not occur when considering the specific effects associated with the ACA and its attempted repeals. Because the benefits of the ACA were intended to primarily help the less fortunate obtain health insurance through subsidies and the expansion of Medicaid, it is of interest whether these policy benefits mobilized and incentivized the less fortunate to monitor the actions taken by their representatives on this issue.

The potential meaning of differences based on income are somewhat hard to interpret. Some have argued that roll calls are more likely to reflect the opinions of wealthier individuals (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014). If so, wealthier individuals may be more likely to react negatively to issue misalignment. On the other hand, given that wealthier individuals are more likely to participate, follow politics and contribute to campaigns (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012) representatives may be more likely to account for those views when deciding which position to take and the effect of issue-disagreement among those individuals that the representative chooses to disobey may be harder to extrapolate from. Even so, separately estimating the relationship for

citizens making more than \$120,000 and less than \$30,000 helps examine whether the effects of the wealthy differ from those with below-average incomes. Moreover, given that the policy benefits of the ACA were targeted towards those making less than the 147% of the federal poverty limit, the investigation also reveals whether issue disagreement had larger effects among the set of respondents who were more likely to benefit from the effects of the ACA.

Because issue misalignment may reflect three different circumstances – 1) being misaligned with both their representative and party (measured by a majority of representatives in the party) on the issue, 2) being misaligned with their representative but not their party (i.e., their representative voted against a majority of their party caucus), and 3) being misaligned with their party caucus but not their representative (i.e., their representative took a position that was consistent with the respondent contrary to the party caucus) – we decompose misalignment on the ACA into groups depending on whether the citizen is: misaligned with the representative’s position and party (*Both*), misaligned with the representative’s position but not with a majority of the representative’s party caucus (*JustRep*), and misaligned with a majority of the representative’s party caucus but not the representative’s position (*JustParty*). Because of the partisan nature of the roll call votes on the ACA, the number of citizens who are in districts where the representative’s position varied from that of their party caucus is small: roughly 45,000 citizens were in districts where they agreed with the position taken by both their representative and the representative’s party caucus, 35,000 citizens were in districts where they disagreed with both their representative and their representative’s party (*Both*), 2900 respondents disagreed with just their representative (*JustRep*), and 3500 respondents only disagreed with the party caucus of their representative (*JustParty*). The first two possibilities should presumably decrease citizens’ support for the representative, but respondents may choose to reward representatives taking a position that matches the respondent’s opinion rather than the opinion of the party caucus.

To recover these effects we use votes supporting the ACA to estimate:⁶

⁶Replicating the results for votes repealing the ACA reveals qualitatively identical relationships.

$$\Pr(\text{Support Rep})_{ij} = \beta * \text{Misaligned Party}_{ij} + \gamma_1 \text{Both}_{ij} + \gamma_2 \text{JustRep}_{ij} + \gamma_3 \text{JustParty}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (3)$$

where *Both* indicates whether the respondent has a different opinion than the representative and a majority of the representative's party caucus in Congress, *JustRep* indicates that the respondent disagrees with the representative but agrees with a majority of the representatives' fellow congress-people, and *JustParty* indicates that the respondent agrees with the representative but disagrees with a majority of the representatives' fellow congresspeople. Figure 4 plots the estimates for estimating equation (3) for various subsets of the data based on the respondent's income. (The effect of party mis-alignment (β) is only needed for the pooled results in the bottom graph of Figure 4 because the results graphed in the top two graphs condition on party alignment when estimating the relationship.)

The results plotted in Figure 4 are consistent with issue-based accountability, the effects among those with the most to gain from the ACA were not more likely to punish representatives for mis-alignment than those with higher incomes. Despite the publicity and attention given to the ACA by the media and elites, the fact that we do not see much evidence that poorer citizens were especially incentivized to engage in issue-based evaluations involving the ACA suggests that the conditions required for strong policy feedback effects may be unlikely to obtain. This is troubling from the perspective of policy feedbacks, as it seems hard to imagine an issue for which position-based evaluations would be more accessible and available than the ACA.

Figure 5 allows the effects of issue misalignment to vary by partisan misalignment for votes related to the ACA (black) and repeals of the ACA (grey) to examine whether party-related differences emerge by estimating equation (3) separately for Democrat-leaning and Republican-leaning respondents.

The bottom graph summarizes the effect of issue misalignment regardless of the respondent's partisanship. The effects are sizable – resulting in a change in predicted probability of -0.37 in terms of whether the citizen approves of the representative for votes associated with the ACA (and slightly larger for votes on repealing the ACA) – but issue-based considerations also matter. There




Figure 4: Effect of Misalignment on ACA votes by Income. The effects are estimated using all partisan leaners (bottom), partisan leaners with incomes less than \$30,000 a year (middle), and partisan leaners making more than \$120,000 a year (top). 95% confidence intervals are clustered by congressional district.




Figure 5: Effect of Misalignment on ACA votes and votes to repeal the ACA by Partisanship. The effects are estimated using all partisan leaners (bottom), partisan aligned citizens (middle), and partisan mis-aligned citizens (top). The effects for the ACA are plotted in black and the effects for Repealing the ACA are plotted in grey. 95% confidence intervals are clustered by congressional district.

is also a considerable effect associated with being misaligned with the position of the representative and the representative's party caucus party (*Both*). Having a different opinion on the ACA from the position taken by the incumbent representative and a majority of the representative's party caucus decreases the probability of the respondent approving of the representative by roughly -0.29. This is a sizable effect size is notable as it is only slightly smaller than the effect size associated with partisan misalignment – suggesting that issue-based considerations can have a sizable effect on citizens' evaluations of their representative.

The effects for *JustParty* and *JustRep* are also broadly consistent with issue-based representation. Instances in which the citizen is misaligned with the representative but not the party caucus of the representative (*JustRep*) is also associated with increased disapproval of the representative. Circumstances where the representative's position matches the respondent's opinion but not a majority of the representative's party (*JustParty*), however, does not result in less approval. This strongly suggests that not only are respondents able to distinguish between the position of the representative and the position of the representative's party caucus, but that they also reward the representative who follows their opinions with higher evaluations. The estimated effects on efforts to repeal the ACA (grey) are qualitatively similar.

Estimating the effects separately for citizens who are party-aligned (middle graph) and party-misaligned (misaligned) with their representative reveals broadly similar effects, although there are some differences depending on whether the votes are related to the ACA or repealing the ACA. However, given the extremely partisan nature of elite voting, relatively few representatives (and therefore respondents) are associated with the *JustParty* and *JustRep* conditions.

Among party-aligned respondents (middle graph), respondents were less likely to approve of their representative if they disagreed with the position taken by the representative and a majority of the representatives' party in Congress (*Both*). However, if respondents agree with the representative's position and disagree with the position of the representative's party caucus (*JustParty*) they are more likely to approve of the representative on votes related to repealing the ACA. (For ACA votes the relationship is indistinguishable from zero.) There are relatively few cases where the representative took a position contrary to their party caucus and public opinion (*JustRep*) related to the

ACA, but respondents in these districts were more likely to evaluate the representative negatively in response. In general, the pattern is consistent with issue-based representation and the ability of respondents to hold their representatives responsible for issue disagreement involving the ACA when evaluating the representative's job performance.

The relationship among party misaligned voters (top graph) reveals a similar pattern. Party misaligned voters unsurprisingly punish representatives with lower evaluations when they disagree with the position taken by the representative and their party (*Both*). However, respondents are more likely to approve of the representative when the representative votes in accordance with citizens' opinions but a majority of the representative's party caucus does not (*JustParty*). Although it is an admittedly odd situation, when the representative votes contrary to the citizens' opinions on votes involving the ACA (*JustRep*) and the mis-aligned respondent agrees with a majority of the representatives' partisans in Congress, the representative's approval surprisingly increases, suggesting that citizens are perhaps incorrectly rewarding the representative for the actions taken by the representative's party (or else that the odd circumstances in which this pattern occurs makes it hard to generalize the effects). Suggestive of the fact that this relationship may be driven by a few districts, respondents (correctly) punish the representative with lower evaluations when the representative votes contrary to their own party caucus and respondents' opinions on votes involving the attempts to repeal the ACA.

Overall, the results that emerge when analyzing the effects of issue-disagreement involving the ACA and its attempted repeal suggest that issue-based considerations matter for citizens' evaluations even for a highly partisan issue with lasting policy and political effects. While individuals who were most likely to benefit from the policy do not appear to be more likely to engage in issue-based evaluations relative to those with considerable means, respondents' evaluations are sensitive to whether the respondent agrees with the representative's position on the ACA.

5 Conclusion

An extensive literature employs a myriad of measures and approaches to characterize whether and how elected officials' positions reflect constituency opinion. We focus on a slightly different question: to what extent does constituency approval of their representative vary by issue and party misalignment? Are voters less likely to support a representative who takes a recorded roll call that is at odds with the opinion they express? How does the effect of issue misalignment compare to the effects of partisan misalignment on citizens' evaluations of their representative and is there evidence that the importance of issues varies between issues and between constituents in light of the considerations that Arnold identifies?

Arnold (1990) highlights the importance of understanding the incentives representatives have for being representative for the type of representation we are likely to observe. In particular, re-election seeking representatives will consider the consequences of their actions and will seek to minimize their electoral risks. Understanding the prevalence of issue-based representation consequently demands that we examine how representatives are likely to perceive the electoral risks of being mis-aligned with their constituents. If constituents evaluate the representative based purely on partisan considerations, for example, then there is little incentive for the representative to follow constituency opinion so long as they are able to maintain their party brand. As a result, assessing the relative importance of party-based and issue-based representation for respondents is critically important for describing the nature of representation that can be expected by representatives seeking to win the approval of those respondents.

Complications emerge because of the difficulty of estimating the counterfactual when we only observe presumably equilibrium behavior. The issue-disagreement we observe is the disagreement that the representative chooses to allow. The assumed optimality of representative behavior means that the effects of issue-disagreement are almost certainly a lower bound – insofar as issue-based representation matters for the set of respondents whose opinions are being consciously ignored, it follows that the effects of issue-based representation likely matter even more for the respondents whose views the representative is choosing to represent. It is difficult to identify precisely how

much issue-based considerations matter for respondents given that the logic of congressional actions suggests that we are almost certainly underestimating their effect by looking at the effects among those respondents that the representative chooses to ignore.

Even so, we are able to evaluate how issue-disagreement impacts citizens' evaluations of representatives *conditional on representatives choosing to disagree with those citizens* on specific issues, on votes related to the Affordable Care Act, and using an aggregate measure of issue-alignment by comparing the effects of issue-misalignment and party-misalignment on respondents' approval of their representative.

Our investigation reveals that issue-based considerations matter for respondent evaluations of their elected representative even despite the shortcomings of the issue-specific opinion measures. We show that respondents rely on more than just partisanship when evaluating their representative. Moreover, there is considerable variation in the importance of issue-based considerations across the issues that respondents were asked about on the CCES. As a result, investigations relying on aggregate measures of issue-misalignment (or summary measures of ideology) almost certainly underestimate the importance of issue-based considerations for voters (and therefore also for representatives). Whereas misalignment on votes related to the ACA is associated with a .2 decrease in Representative approval, the effect of going from 0% to 100% misaligned on the entire set of CCES issues is also only .2. Ignoring the between-individual and between-issue differences appears to dramatically understate the importance of issues – a point Arnold (1990) makes forcefully.

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Table 2: Full Results: CCES 2008 - CCES 2012

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	(2008)	(2009)	RepApprove (2010)	(2011)	(2012)
MisalignedPty	-0.430*** (0.013)	-0.360*** (0.012)	-0.370*** (0.006)	-0.197*** (0.018)	-0.464*** (0.006)
MA_IraqWithdraw	-0.103*** (0.013)				
MA_MinWage	-0.069*** (0.011)				
MA_StemCell	-0.077*** (0.011)				
MA_BankBail	-0.047*** (0.010)				
MA_HomeAssist	-0.058*** (0.011)				
MA_NAFTA	-0.047*** (0.010)				
MA_FISA	-0.078*** (0.011)				
MA_ACA		-0.128*** (0.011)	-0.165*** (0.006)	-0.227*** (0.027)	
MA_RecoverReinvest		-0.137*** (0.011)	-0.138*** (0.006)	0.015 (0.029)	
MA_CapTrade		-0.050*** (0.010)	-0.048*** (0.005)		
MA_CHIP		-0.049*** (0.009)	-0.057*** (0.004)	-0.028* (0.015)	
MA_LillyLed		-0.014 (0.010)			
MA_DADT			-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.065*** (0.015)	
MA_RepealACA					-0.157*** (0.006)
MA_RyanBudget					-0.034*** (0.005)
MA_SimpsonBudget					-0.005 (0.005)
MA_KoreaTrade					-0.007 (0.005)
MA_Keystone					-0.075*** (0.005)
Constant	0.982*** (0.010)	0.922*** (0.007)	0.911*** (0.003)	0.786*** (0.010)	0.917*** (0.005)
Observations	6,356	9,050	38,239	4,846	29,136
R ²	0.386	0.363	0.470	0.170	0.374
Adjusted R ²	0.385	0.363	0.470	0.169	0.373
Residual Std. Error	0.385 (df = 6347)	0.389 (df = 9043)	0.361 (df = 38232)	0.452 (df = 4840)	0.386 (df = 29129)
F Statistic	499.049*** (df = 8; 6347)	858.936*** (df = 6; 9043)	5,654.945*** (df = 6; 38232)	198.621*** (df = 5; 4840)	2,894.776*** (df = 6; 29129)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: Full Results: CCES 2013 - CCES 2017

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	RepApprove				
	(2013)	(2014)	(2015)	(2016)	(2017)
MisalignedPty	-0.364*** (0.011)	-0.414*** (0.007)	-0.415*** (0.019)	-0.470*** (0.013)	-0.467*** (0.010)
MA_RepealACA	-0.194*** (0.011)	-0.190*** (0.007)	-0.164*** (0.018)	-0.231*** (0.013)	
MA_AbortionBan	-0.083*** (0.009)				
MA_VAWA	-0.054*** (0.009)		-0.026* (0.015)		
MA_StudentSuccess	-0.095*** (0.009)			-0.036*** (0.009)	
MA_TaxHikePrevent		-0.022*** (0.005)			
MA_DebtLimit		0.033*** (0.005)			
MA_MCTax		-0.019*** (0.005)			
MA_USAFreedom			0.007 (0.015)	0.002 (0.009)	
MA_Keystone			-0.090*** (0.018)		
MA_TPP			-0.052*** (0.015)	-0.033*** (0.008)	
MA_MedicareAccount				-0.014 (0.009)	
MA_Highway				-0.004 (0.011)	
MA_RussiaSanction					-0.011 (0.010)
MA_KateLaw					-0.0004 (0.008)
MA_Approp					-0.044*** (0.009)
MA_AHCA					-0.151*** (0.010)
MA_FinancialChoice					-0.093*** (0.009)
Constant	0.908*** (0.007)	0.868*** (0.006)	0.903*** (0.015)	0.899*** (0.009)	0.918*** (0.007)
Observations	9,407	26,326	3,009	7,814	9,794
R ²	0.366	0.332	0.342	0.442	0.384
Adjusted R ²	0.365	0.331	0.341	0.441	0.384
Residual Std. Error	0.394 (df = 9401)	0.398 (df = 26320)	0.397 (df = 3002)	0.370 (df = 7806)	0.384 (df = 9787)
F Statistic	1,083.661*** (df = 5; 9401)	2,611.173*** (df = 5; 26320)	260.184*** (df = 6; 3002)	882.327*** (df = 7; 7806)	1,016.448*** (df = 6; 9787)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Full Results: Aggregate Misalignment By Party

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	(Pooled)	RepApprove (Dem)	(Rep)
Pct. Misaligned Issues	-0.200*** (0.005)	-0.219*** (0.007)	-0.197*** (0.007)
Misaligned Party	-0.408*** (0.004)	-0.443*** (0.006)	-0.378*** (0.006)
2009	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)
2010	-0.044*** (0.004)	-0.040*** (0.005)	-0.046*** (0.005)
2011	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.108*** (0.006)	0.075*** (0.006)
2012	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.011** (0.005)
2013	-0.044*** (0.005)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.053*** (0.007)
2014	0.005 (0.004)	0.009* (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
2015	-0.029*** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.043*** (0.008)
2016	-0.058*** (0.004)	-0.052*** (0.005)	-0.064*** (0.005)
2017	-0.047*** (0.005)	-0.053*** (0.007)	-0.031*** (0.007)
Misaligned Interaction	-0.156*** (0.007)	-0.053*** (0.010)	-0.257*** (0.010)
Constant	0.915*** (0.003)	0.918*** (0.005)	0.919*** (0.005)
Observations	226,078	121,819	104,259
R ²	0.337	0.320	0.366
Adjusted R ²	0.337	0.320	0.365
Residual Std. Error	0.400 (df = 226065)	0.406 (df = 121806)	0.389 (df = 104246)
F Statistic	9,593.945*** (df = 12; 226065)	4,785.444*** (df = 12; 121806)	5,005.356*** (df = 12; 104246)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Full Results: Aggregate Misalignment By Party & Income

	Dependent variable:					
	RepApprove					
	(Low Income)	(Low Income Dem)	(Low Income Rep)	(High Income)	(High Income Dem)	(High Income Rep)
Pct. Misaligned Issues	-0.147*** (0.011)	-0.252*** (0.011)	-0.143*** (0.015)	-0.168*** (0.018)	-0.295*** (0.017)	-0.236*** (0.015)
Misaligned Party	-0.319*** (0.009)	-0.515*** (0.009)	-0.349*** (0.012)	-0.281*** (0.015)	-0.541*** (0.015)	-0.506*** (0.012)
2009	0.010 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.010)	0.036** (0.016)	-0.028 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.014)
2010	-0.050*** (0.010)	-0.040*** (0.007)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.091*** (0.015)	-0.044*** (0.011)	-0.036*** (0.009)
2011	-0.056*** (0.011)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.091*** (0.014)	0.013 (0.017)	-0.123*** (0.015)	0.075*** (0.014)
2012	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.014* (0.008)	0.004 (0.012)	-0.053*** (0.015)	-0.024** (0.012)	-0.011 (0.010)
2013	-0.046*** (0.012)	-0.060*** (0.011)	-0.029* (0.015)	-0.068*** (0.019)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.015)
2014	-0.004 (0.010)	0.006 (0.008)	0.017 (0.012)	-0.032** (0.015)	0.017 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.011)
2015	-0.024* (0.013)	-0.040*** (0.012)	0.007 (0.017)	-0.075*** (0.021)	-0.025 (0.019)	-0.059*** (0.017)
2016	-0.057*** (0.010)	-0.056*** (0.008)	-0.027** (0.013)	-0.098*** (0.015)	-0.054*** (0.012)	-0.057*** (0.011)
2017	-0.052*** (0.012)	-0.043*** (0.011)	-0.031** (0.015)	-0.072*** (0.019)	-0.033** (0.015)	-0.052*** (0.015)
Misaligned Interaction	-0.161*** (0.017)	-0.095*** (0.017)	-0.088*** (0.022)	-0.283*** (0.027)	0.013 (0.026)	-0.158*** (0.022)
Constant	0.867*** (0.009)	0.953*** (0.007)	0.842*** (0.012)	0.910*** (0.014)	0.959*** (0.011)	0.954*** (0.009)
Observations	42,643	36,854	27,065	15,578	16,992	19,862
R ²	0.219	0.467	0.211	0.243	0.446	0.490
Adjusted R ²	0.219	0.467	0.210	0.242	0.446	0.490
Residual Std. Error	0.433 (df = 42630)	0.360 (df = 36841)	0.437 (df = 27052)	0.424 (df = 15565)	0.367 (df = 16979)	0.352 (df = 19849)
F Statistic	995.089*** (df = 12; 42630)	2,687.075*** (df = 12; 36841)	602.085*** (df = 12; 27052)	415.820*** (df = 12; 15565)	1,139.677*** (df = 12; 16979)	1,590.502*** (df = 12; 19849)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Roll Call Votes

Bill	Bill Title	Date	Vote
HR 3364	Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act	7/25/2017	(419-3)
HR 3003	No Sanctuary for Criminals Act	6/26/2017	(228-195)
HR 3004	Kate's Law	6/26/2017	(257-167)
HR 10	Financial Choice Act	6/8/2017	(233-186)
HR 1628	American Health Care Act	5/4/2017	(217-213)
HR 244	Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017	5/3/2017	(409-1)
HR 2353	Highway and Transportation Funding Act	5/19/2016	(287-35)
HR 2	Medicare Accountability and Cost	3/26/2016	(392-37)
HR 3762	2017 Budget Resolution	1/6/2016	(240-81)
S 1	Keystone Pipeline	12/11/2015	(270-152)
S 1177	Every Student Succeeds Act	12/2/2015	(359-64)
HR 1314	Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015	10/28/2015	(266-167)
HR 2048	USA Freedom Act	5/13/2015	(338-88)
HR 596	To Repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act	2/3/2015	(239-186)
HR 5771	Tax Hike Prevention Act	12/3/2014	(378-46)
HR 5	Student Success Act	7/19/2013	(218-213)
HR 1797	Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act	6/18/2013	(228-196)
HR 45	To Repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act	5/16/2013	(245-189)
S 47	Violence Against Women Act	2/28/2013	(286-138)
HR 325	Debt Ceiling	1/23/2013	(285-144)
HR 112	Simpson-Bowels Budget Agreement	2/28/12	(382-38)
HR 3630	Middle Class Tax Cut Act	12/13/2011	(234-193)
HR 3080	US Korea Free Trade Agreement	10/12/2011	(278-151)
HR 1938	Keystone Pipeline	7/28/2011	(293-126)
HR 34	Establishing the budget for the United States Government for fiscal year 2012	4/15/2011	(235-193)
HR 2	Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act	1/19/2011	(245-189)
HR 3590	Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act	3/21/2010	(219-212)
HR 4173	Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act	12/11/2009	(223-199)
HR 2965	Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act	7/8/2009	(230-194)
HR 2454	American Clean Energy and Security Act	6/26/2009	(218-212)
HR 1	American Recovery and Reinvestment Act	1/28/2009	(244-188)
S 181	Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act	1/27/2009	(247-171)
HR 2	State's Children Health Insurance Program	1/14/2009	(289-139)
HR 1424	Troubled Asset Relief Program	10/3/2008	(262-171)
HR 3221	Housing and Economic Recovery Act	7/23/2008	(239-169)
HR 976	State's Children Health Insurance Program	9/25/2007	(262-156)
S 1927	Protect America Act	8/4/2007	(292-129)
HR 2956	Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act	7/12/2007	(169-247)
S 5	Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act	6/7/2007	(243-171)
HR 2	Fair Minimum Wage Act	1/10/2007	(306-114)